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ABSTRACT
We present a scheme for secure and privacy-preserving com-
munication in hybrid ad hoc networks. Our scheme en-
ables users to secure communication and to protect their
anonymity and location privacy. Our approach is based
on frequently changing node pseudonyms and cryptographic
keys, which enable users to avoid being identiﬁed by the lo-
cations they visit, or by the type of traﬃc they generate. We
show how our scheme can be eﬀectively used for secure and
private routing in hybrid ad hoc networks. We study the
robustness of the proposed solution with respect to various
attacks. We further show that the proposed solution intro-
duces a very moderate overhead to the network operation.1
Categories and Subject Descriptors
C.0 [Computer-Communication Networks]: [Security
and protection]
General Terms
Security, Anonymity, Location, Privacy
Keywords
Anonymity, Privacy, Mobile Networks, Hybrid Networks
1. INTRODUCTION
Ad hoc networks are appealing for a number of reasons, in-
cluding their ﬂexibility of deployment. However, these net-
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works are known to have limited scalability, and do not pro-
vide, as such, an access to large scale networks such as the
Internet. For this reason, several researchers have recently
studied the possible interconnection of ad hoc networks to a
backbone by means of one or several access points [25]. In
this way, a mobile station can communicate with an access
point over several other mobile stations in a multi-hop fash-
ion. It is reasonable to assume that one or several network
operators are in charge of the proper operation of such net-
works, and receive an appropriate remuneration from their
subscribers.
This approach seems to be promising, as it combines the
best of both worlds: the extended reach and scalability of
classical, large-scale wired networks with the ﬂexibility of ad
hoc networks; in this paper, we call a network resulting from
this combination a “hybrid ad hoc network”. A possible in-
carnation of such a network is a multi-hop Wi-Fi network.
In this case, the network operator would typically be a Wire-
less Internet Service Provider. Other examples of hybrid ad
hoc networks include multi-hop cellular networks [37].
In order to gain acceptance from the users, hybrid ad hoc
networks must provide an appropriate level of security. In-
deed in general, a user trusts his network operator, but he
does not trust the other users; he may also distrust the op-
erators of the networks in which he roams.
The paper addresses both routing security and privacy
preservation; we will show that the two mechanisms can be
embedded in the same protocols.
A number of papers [16, 28, 32] have recently addressed
the problem of secure routing in ad hoc networks. We base
our threat analysis on the extensive description of attacks
provided by these research eﬀorts.
As for privacy, we show how to provide the two following
features: anonymity and location privacy. Privacy Interna-
tional [38] deﬁnes four categories of privacy: information pri-
vacy, bodily privacy, communication privacy, and territorial
privacy. Location privacy is a particular case of information
privacy and can be deﬁned as the ability to prevent other
parties from learning one’s current and past locations [3].
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Anonymity can be deﬁned as the state of being not identifi-
able within a set of subjects called the anonymity set [30].
We propose a set of protocols that protects users’ anonymity
and location privacy. More precisely, our scheme enables
each mobile node to keep its location and its identiﬁer hid-
den from other network nodes. We assume, however, that
the network operator has access to the locations and the
identiﬁers (and potentially also to the user identities) of
the registered mobile nodes. Our approach is based on the
frequently changing of node pseudonyms, so that the users
avoid being identiﬁed by the locations they visit, or by the
type of traﬃc they generate. We do not restrict our investi-
gation to privacy, but we also investigate how privacy can be
achieved and user accountability enforced. In our scheme,
accountability is enforced through dynamic, but veriﬁable,
cryptographic keys used by the nodes to secure their com-
munication.
Although originally designed for data-centric hybrid ad hoc
networks, our scheme can be, with some minor modiﬁca-
tions, used to enable secure and privacy-preserving commu-
nication in hybrid voice-centric networks.
In this paper we speciﬁcally: (i) present an overview of pri-
vacy threats, (ii) propose a scheme for secure and privacy-
preserving communication, and (iii) present a quantitative
analysis of privacy.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. We introduce
our system and security model in Section 2. In Section 3,
we describe privacy challenges and goals. In Section 4, we
describe the basic mechanisms of our scheme. In Section
5, we provide a detailed description of our privacy preserv-
ing routing protocol. In Sections 6 we quantify the level
of achieved privacy, analyze security and the performance
of our scheme. We describe the related work in Section 7.
Finally, we present our conclusions in Section 8.
2. SYSTEM MODEL
In this section we describe our network model along with
the security and trust assumptions.
2.1 Network model
Our system consists of a set of access points, mutually con-
nected via a high-speed backbone, and a set of mobile nodes.
Each access point controls a bounded geographic area called
a control area. All communications between nodes and be-
tween a node and a access point are wireless. We assume
that the access points and mobile nodes have the same power
range, and that the latter is smaller than the size of the con-
trol area. We further assume that all links are bi-directional,
meaning that the link between two nodes (or between a node
and a access point) exists only if both mobile nodes are in
each others’ power range. This means that the majority of
nodes in the control area will not be able to communicate di-
rectly with an access point, but will use other mobile nodes
as relays to reach the bases stations.
In order to make our study as generic as possible, we will
consider that both hosts involved in the communication ac-
cess the backbone in a multi-hop fashion.
When a source node S wishes to send a message m to a
destination D, it transmits a packet p containing m to a
ﬁrst access point BSS (which is typically the geographically
closest access point to S) using an uplink protocol. If the
destination node is mobile, the packet is then sent to a sec-
ond access point BSD, which is typically the closest station
to the destination D. Then, BSD transmits a packet con-
taining m to the intended destination D using a downlink
protocol. If the destination node is a ﬁxed (internet) host,
the packet is routed through the ﬁxed network using tra-
ditional network protocols. Both the uplink and downlink
protocols are multi-hop, i.e., they require the participation
of nodes on the route. These nodes are typically peers of the
source and destination. Later we detail the two protocols.
We assume that all nodes in the control area are loosely
synchronized; we later describe how to avoid clock skew.
2.2 Security and Trust
We initially assume that all access points are run by the
same operator (we describe later how to loosen this assump-
tion). Each mobile node has a unique identifier, and carries
a secret key, both of which are also known by the network op-
erator2. Neither the identiﬁer nor the secret key is disclosed
to other parties. Like in cellular networks, there is a contrac-
tual agreement between a user of the mobile node and the
network operator, which deﬁnes mutual rights and obliga-
tions. This contract deﬁnes policies that are enforced by the
operator, charging, privacy protection and tariﬀ. Notably,
the network central authority (through its access points)
acts as a network supervisor, and protects the network from
user misbehavior. The access points therefore monitor node
behavior, maintain node reputations and detect node misbe-
havior. As a reaction to node misbehavior, central authority
limits node’s access to a subset of services or excludes the
node from the network, temporarily, or permanently, by re-
voking its membership certiﬁcate.
The network membership is controlled by the network cen-
tral authority and each node carries a certiﬁcate of member-
ship that it uses to prove to other nodes that it is a part of
the network. Furthermore, each node is able to uniquely sign
a message such that other users can verify that the message
originated from the legitimate network node, but no one,
except the central authority can identify which node signed
the message. This is important for ensuring that the exe-
cution of network protocols is both secure and anonymous,
and that the users are accountable for their behavior by the
uniqueness of their signatures.
However, the users do not have mutual contractual agree-
ments, and are not willing to trust each other with their
identities and locations, nor do they want to trust each oth-
ers’ nodes to correctly execute networking functions (for-
wards packets, or provide accurate routing information).
To summarize, we assume that each node carries a secret
key shared with the network central authority and a set of
2For simplicity, we assume that the network operator dis-
tributes secret keys and node identiﬁers to the access points
under its control. In reality, nodes would establish shared
secret keys with the access points, using a certiﬁcate issued
to them by the central authority.
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keys, certiﬁed by the operator, which it uses to secure the
operation network protocols.
3. PRIVACY GOALS AND CHALLENGES
In this section we outlay our main design goals and privacy
challenges for hybrid ad hoc networks.
3.1 Design goals
We want to design a system that enables the users anony-
mous and location private communication. Location pri-
vacy is the ability to prevent other parties from learning
one’s current and past locations, and anonymity is the state
of being not identiﬁable within a set of subjects called the
anonymity set. Here, we deﬁne these terms more precisely
in the context of hybrid ad hoc networks.
One of the main goals of our scheme is to enable source
and destination anonymity. Source anonymity is deﬁned as
the property that a particular message is not linkable to
any source, and vice-versa. A similar deﬁnition applies to
destination anonymity. Unlinkability in this context means
that the probability that a particular message was sent by
a given source and/or received by the same destination is
the same as imposed by the a priori knowledge. This means
that the process of sending and/or receiving messages does
not reveal any additional information about the identities of
the source and/or destination that was not already known
to the attacker prior to the message transmission.
In our scenario, we want to achieve the following. Clearly,
the source S needs to know the identity D of the destina-
tion, but not its location. The access points need to know
who the source and the destination are, and where they are
located, so as to route the messages accordingly. The ac-
cess points need to know the identities of the source and the
destination, in order to check if they are registered network
nodes. However, nobody else, including the nodes on the
route of the packet, should be able to infer either the source
of any packet that they observe, or its destination. Further-
more, nobody should be able to infer where the nodes are
located. This means that neither a node not registered to
the network, nor a registered network node, could infer the
identities of the communicating parties or their locations by
observing network traﬃc. Here, we consider that a loca-
tion of the node is compromised if an attacker can infer the
distance in terms of number of hops (relay nodes) from the
node to the access point(s), or its exact physical location.
Note that we do not assume any sophisticated mechanisms
for node positioning, such as the use of GPS.
Anonymity can be measured with various metrics, among
which two are the most common: one based on
anonymity set and other based on entropy. In our system, if
the attacker holds the list of registered network nodes, the
maximum degree of anonymity that the system can provide
is proportional to the size of the list; in this case, the list
corresponds to the anonymity set of the network. We will
assume that the network has a suﬃciently large anonymity
set, so that it thus provides a reasonable anonymity to the
users. The second metric is more sophisticated and is com-
puted based on probabilities assigned to each identity (e.g.,
the probability that a given user is the originator of a mes-
sage). In our analysis, we will reason in terms of both of
these metrics.
3.2 Privacy challenges
In hybrid ad hoc networks, users’ privacy is at risk from
various threats. Here we overview the most important ones.
Malicious/Compromised users
In hybrid ad hoc networks, nodes need to maintain their
neighborhood information for various reasons, mainly for
routing and packet forwarding and as a prerequisite to run-
ning distributed network algorithms (e.g., positioning).
Thus, to enable proper network operation, the nodes would
need to disseminate to other nodes their identiﬁers, topology
information and/or locations. This information would then
be freely available to any registered network node, or even
to a passive attacker that observes network communication.
It is thus clear that even a single node, by logging the iden-
tiﬁers of its neighbor nodes, can gather much information
about other users’ behavior (e.g., if the attacker stays at the
same location for a longer time, it can observe the frequency
at which other nodes visit this location).
Active attacks can be far more sophisticated. A simple ex-
ample of such an attack is when an attacker periodically ex-
plores network topology by asking for routes to other nodes.
Another possible attack is if an attacker positions itself close
to the access point and thus gathers the information about
the communication between nodes. If the routing protocol
is not secure, the attacker could even, regardless of its loca-
tion, advertise the shortest route to the access point, collect
the the traﬃc, and analyze it to observe which pairs of nodes
currently communicate, and what are the nodes’ distances
to the access point(s). Another important set of attacks
are those launched by communication parties against each
other, meaning that a source wants to discover a location of
the destination, or vice versa.
Untrusted network operators
Nodes roaming in untrusted networks are susceptible to at-
tacks from malicious network operators. Unless the user
does not protect its privacy, an untrusted operator could
easily trace users and/or reveal their true identity. This is
especially important as the number of network operators in
hybrid ad hoc and multi-hop WiFi networks might be sig-
niﬁcantly larger than the number of operators of today’s
cellular networks. It will be thus hard to regulate all oper-
ators and risks of privacy violation would be higher.
Unique network addresses, interface addresses
and cryptographic keys
One of the main potential causes of users’ privacy vulnera-
bilities in hybrid ad hoc networks could be the uniqueness of
the identiﬁers and keys that the nodes use to communicate
and to secure their communication. Typically, each node
uses a static and unique network address to perform network
layer operations, and static and unique interface addresses
for media access control (MAC) operations. Furthermore, to
secure their mutual communication, nodes need to establish
keys between each other and with the access points. These
keys enable nodes to authenticate the source of the messages
that they receive and to protect the conﬁdentiality and in-
tegrity of the messages that they send. The fact that the
keys are unique either to the node (public key cryptogra-
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phy), or to the pair of nodes (symmetric key cryptography)
enables a malicious user to track other users.
Radio fingerprinting
Besides unique identiﬁers, the nodes are equipped with ra-
dio transceivers whose emitted signals contain unique ﬁn-
gerprints [34]. An attacker can, therefore, identify a mo-
bile device by the unique “ﬁngerprint” that characterizes its
signal transmission. This process is normally used by cel-
lular network operators to prevent cloning fraud; namely, a
cloned phone does not have the same ﬁngerprint as the le-
gal phone with the same electronic identiﬁcation numbers.
This technique can be used by the attacker to track mobile
nodes, given that the attacker remains in the power range of
the node. A similar technique is that an attacker observes
the signal to noise (S/N) ratio of nodes’ signals. If a node is
static for a given period of time and uses pseudonyms to pro-
tect its identity, the attacker can infer that the pseudonyms
are generated by the same node since the S/N ratio did not
change. Recent measurements in WiFi networks [13] show
that S/N based attack can signiﬁcantly reduce the capability
of the nodes to prevent tracking.
4. OVERVIEW OF THE SOLUTION
In this section, we introduce two important ingredients of
our privacy preserving scheme: node pseudonyms, and dy-
namic public keys. At the end of the section, we deﬁne the
notation that we use in the paper.
4.1 Node pseudonyms
As we mentioned earlier, each node shares a secret key with
the access point. This key and the node’s true identity are
known only to the node and to the authority that controls
the access point. A node pseudonym changes over time,
according to the following equation:
PS(t) = HMACKS (IDS , t)
where PS is the node pseudonym at time step t, HMAC
is a keyed hashing function, IDS is the true node identity,
and KS is the secret key that the node shares with the cen-
tral authority. HMAC can be implemented by any iterative
cryptographic hash function, such as, MD5 or SHA-1. The
cryptographic strength of HMAC depends on the properties
of the underlying hash function. Thus, the pseudonyms of
the node will be of the same size as the output of the hash
function that is used for keyed hashing; if used with SHA-1,
the HMAC output is 160 bits long. Depending on the size
of each control area, and the number of nodes in the con-
trol area, the pseudonym length can be reduced, without
signiﬁcantly increasing the probability of identiﬁer collision.
For this, the pseudonyms obtained from the original equa-
tion can be truncated or hashed into shorter bit strings. To
guarantee that the access point and the node generate the
same node pseudonyms at the same time, the time is slot-
ted and t as an input to the HMAC function represents a
time step, and not the actual timestamp provided by the de-
vices. We later discuss how to choose the time granularity.
Alternative ways to generate node pseudonyms can be envi-
sioned. One solution consist in generating node pseudonyms
by making use of pseudo-random number generators.
4.2 Dynamic keys
To ensure that the communication between nodes and the
access points is performed through legitimate nodes, the
nodes that belong to the same control area need to be able
to verify that the messages they receive come from the reg-
istered network nodes. At the same time, we need to ensure
that the central authority can track the actions of each in-
dividual node and that the misbehavior of nodes can thus
be detected and sanctioned.
Securing ad hoc routing protocols in multi-hop wireless net-
works is notoriously hard. Researchers have identiﬁed a
number of attacks that can be mounted equally against pure
ad hoc and hybrid ad hoc networks. These attacks include:
excessive route requests, blackhole attack [16], rushing at-
tack [18], wormhole attack [15], etc. In hybrid ad hoc net-
works, due to the presence of access points, routing will be
easier to secure, as access points can control node behav-
ior, act as on-line central authorities and sanction misbe-
havior. Nevertheless, like in ad hoc networks, to protect
the network against these attacks, nodes need to be able to
authenticate each others’ messages and even to keep their
communication conﬁdential. For this, nodes need to share
secret keys or hold authentic public-keys. We propose here,
a privacy-preserving key management scheme for hybrid ad
hoc networks.
A naive solution would be to make use of control area-
wide secret keys. This scheme assumes that the nodes
that belong to the same control area share a common secret
key. This key is generated and in an authentic and conﬁden-
tial manner distributed to all the nodes in the control area
by the access point that controls the control area. The key
is periodically updated by the access point. The introduc-
tion of the control area-wide key enables each node to verify
if other nodes belong to the network, without revealing any
information about its identity or the identity of the other
nodes. However, if any of the control area nodes is com-
promised, the attacker can use the control area-wide key to
attack the network without being detected. Furthermore,
the access point will not be able to detect node misbehavior
as each node uses the same control area key for authentica-
tion to other nodes.
Given the drawbacks of the control area-wide key scheme,
we propose a diﬀerent scheme that we call a dynamic pub-
lic key scheme. In this scheme, along with its changing
pseudonym, each node A holds a set of public/private
key pairs (PK1A/PrK
1
A, ..., PK
n
A/PrK
n
A) and certiﬁcates
signed by the central authority, certifying these keys. This
set can be generated either by the node or by the central
authority. If it generates the key pairs, the node sends the
public keys from the pairs to the central authority, which
certiﬁes them and sends the certiﬁcates back to the node. If
the public/private key pairs are generated by the central au-
thority, they are sent to the node along with the certiﬁcates
containing the public keys. The certiﬁcates of the public
keys signed by the central authority certify only that the
holder of the private key corresponding to the public key in
the certiﬁcate is a registered network node. The certiﬁcates
have the following format:
CertkA = [PK
k
A, SIGPrKAuth(PK
k
A)]
where k denotes the position of the key in the key set of A,
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and PrKAuth is the private key of the central authority
3.
We note here that the exchange of public/private key pairs
between a node and the central authority is protected by
the key shared between the node and the central authority.
A node uses its public/private key pairs to establish sym-
metric secret keys with its neighbors. Each time that a node
changes its pseudonym, it changes the public/private key
pair and establishes new symmetric keys with its neighbors.
If a node encounters a new neighbor, it establishes a secret
key with the new neighbor using the same public/private key
that it uses for this period. Before a node runs out of pub-
lic/private key pairs, it generates some new pairs and sends
them to the central authority for certiﬁcation. The central
authority replies with the certiﬁed keys. This update of
public keys and certiﬁcates can be performed in a number
of ways, through periodic updates, or by piggybacking the
certiﬁcates on uplink and downlink traﬃc. Moreover, as we
discuss in Section 6, the nodes can reuse the private/public
key pairs after some time, without compromising their loca-
tion and identity privacy.
The nodes do not have to change their public keys (and
pseudonyms) at a given frequency, but this change can be
event driven (e.g. when a node starts a new session). For
eﬃciency, the speed of key changes can be limited by the
access points, but each user can determine if it wants its
pseudonyms and keys being changed with a lower frequency.
To enable this, the nodes need to change their keys and
pseudonyms at frequencies which are related to the given
basic frequency4.
We will comment brieﬂy on other alternatives to this pro-
posal in Section 7.
In our proposal, mutual node authentication is performed
automatically, so that routing is secured permanently. How-
ever, the system can be also designed in such way that nodes
perform mutual authentication only if they are requested to
do so by the access point; notably, if the access point de-
tects misbehavior within a given region of its control area,
it can enforce mutual node authentication in that region to
prevent future misbehavior. This optimization can reduce
the communication overhead introduced by the dynamic key
scheme.
Update frequency
The frequency of the key and pseudonym change can be
chosen arbitrarily by the base stations and mobile nodes. To
increase the level of anonymity and location privacy, nodes
should increase their update frequencies. However, as we
show in Section 6.3, pseudonym/key change frequency is
only one of the factors that determines the degree of privacy
that can be achieved, whereas others are related to node
mobility and attacker strength. We further conclude that in
our scenario the suﬃcient frequency of pseudonym change
is in the order of 1/min.
4.3 Further notation
3Note that neither the identity of the node nor the position
of the key in its key set are disclosed to other nodes.
4This basic frequency is a system parameter and is con-
trolled by the access point.
By BSS we denote the access point that controls the control
area in which node S is located. By MACK(m) we denote
the message authentication code of message m with the key
K. A one-way hash function on message m we denote by
H(m). By EK(m), we denote a message encrypted with the
key K, and by SIGPrK(m) we denote the signature over
message m with the private key PrK.
5. PRIVACY PRESERVING ROUTING
In this section, we introduce thePrivacy PreservingRouting
protocol (PPR). This protocol consists of four sub-protocols
that we describe in brief as follows. We ﬁrst describe the
downlink protocol that is used for routing from the access
point BSD to the destination node D; we then describe
the uplink protocol that is used to route packets from the
source node S to the ﬁrst access point BSS ; next we de-
scribe the inter-station protocol used to communicate mes-
sages between access points; ﬁnally, we describe the book-
keeping protocol that is used by the access points to keep
track of node locations, pseudonyms and network topology.
5.1 Protocol overview
In this section we brieﬂy overview PPR.
Downlink. As we will show later in more detail, the down-
link protocol is a source routing protocol and it is a rather
straightforward. The access point BSD ﬁrst determines the
route to the destination D, given the information that it
has about the location and topology of the nodes in its
control area. It computes the current pseudonyms of the
nodes on the route, and includes them in the packet, after
which it sends the packet to the ﬁrst node on the route.
The ﬁrst node, addressed by its pseudonym, removes its
pseudonym descriptor from the packet and transmits the
resulting packet to the next node on the route. Eventually,
and assuming the route is not broken, the packet is received
by the intended destination D.
Uplink. It is evident that a simple modiﬁcation of the
downlink protocol cannot be used for uplink communica-
tion. The reason is that the packet originator S does not
know the pseudonyms of the nodes on the path to the access
point BSS , nor does it have access to the database speci-
fying the location of various nodes. For this reason, we de-
signed the downlink protocol as a distance vector protocol.
In fact, given the requirements on privacy, nodes will not
build routing tables, as these are irrelevant in that they are
constantly changing with the rapid updates of pseudonyms.
Instead, each node will keep track of its distance (in terms
of number of hops) to the closest access point, along with
the time at which this distance was known to be correct.
When a packet is sent from one node to another, the send-
ing node will announce its believed distance to the access
point, and its neighbors will determine whether to route the
packet based on this information. Nodes will update the
distance information over time to reﬂect the changes of the
topology.
Inter-station. Here we brieﬂy describe the inter-station
protocol used for the communication between two access
points, one controlling the control area of the source, and the
other controlling the control area of the destination. If both
access points are under the control of the same authority,
5
the inter-station protocol is straightforward. Each uplink
packet that arrives to the source access point BSS is simply
forwarded to the destination access point BSD, where the
message is veriﬁed. Subsequently, a corresponding downlink
packet is created, encrypted with the keys that the access
point shares with nodes on the path, and sent to the destina-
tion. If the node does not trust the access point controlling
its control area, the inter-station protocol is somewhat more
complex. We elaborate this further in Section 5.4.
Book-keeping. The access points keep records of the iden-
tities, pseudonyms, keys and distances of the nodes in their
cells. Based on trust and pre-established policies, the access
points also exchange this information. The databases are
indexed by all ﬁve of these types of information, and are up-
dated by piggybacking information on uplink messages and
by periodic updates. Not only access points, but also mobile
nodes keep information about their location and distance to
the access points. This information is updated either from
the downlink traﬃc or upon the execution of the periodic
updates.
Discussion. We note here that the PPR is a proactive
routing protocol, and that other, potentially fairly diﬀer-
ent solutions for routing in hybrid ad hoc networks can be
proposed. Nevertheless, as we will show, the way that se-
cure and privacy-preserving communication is implemented
in PPR can be a useful inspiration for making other (pos-
sibly reactive, or proactive-reactive) protocols secure and
privacy-preserving.
5.2 Uplink
In this section we describe the uplink protocol in more detail.
As we already described, nodes establish symmetric secret
keys with their neighbors. As we show, we use these keys to
secure network protocols and privacy of users.
The uplink protocol works as follows. Each node regularly
updates the list of its neighbors (their pseudonyms) and
their distances to the access point. Each neighbor and dis-
tance update are properly secured with the keys that the
node shares with its neighbors. When the node S needs to
send a packet, it chooses the next hop node from the list of
its neighbors and forwards the packet to the chosen node.
The choice of the next hop node is based on the distance
information provided by the neighbors; typically, the source
forwards the message to the node that is the closest to the
access point. Each consecutive node repeats this procedure
until the message reaches the access point. The nodes main-
tain their distances to the access point with a book-keeping
protocol, as described in Section 5.5.
An example of the uplink protocol execution is shown on
Figure 1. The ﬁgure shows the message evolution from the
message source node S, through nodes A and B, to the
access point BSS .
Here, Up means that the message is an uplink message,
tS , tA and tB are timestamps that guarantee message fresh-
ness, BSS is the identiﬁer of the access point to which the
message is sent, EKS (D,m) is the encrypted identifer of the
message and of the destination identiﬁer (it can only be de-
crypted by the access point), and m is the message from
UPLINK PROTOCOL
S : MHead = [PS(t), PA(t), tS , Up,BSS ]
: ES = EKS (D,m)
: MSA = MACKSA (MHead,ES)
S → A : [PS(t), PA(t), Up, tS , BSS ] | ES | MSA
A : check the validity of MSA
: MHead = [PA(t), PB(t), tA, up,BSS ]
: EA = EKA (PS(t), ES)
: MAB = MACKAB (MHead,EA)
A→ B : [PA(t), PB(t), Up, tA, BSS ] | EA | MAB
B : check the validity of MAB
: MHead = [PB(t), BSS , tB , Up,BSS ]
: EB = EKB (PA(t), EA)
: MB = MACKB (MHead,EB)
B → BSS : [PB(t), BSS , Up, tB , BSS ] | EB | MB
BSS : decrypt EB , EA, and ES , check
the validity of MB ;
: update the distances of S, A
and B in the distance database
Figure 1: An example of the run of the uplink pro-
tocol. The fields changing from the previous hop are
underlined.
S intended for the destination D. In each packet, the ﬁrst
pseudonym in the message represents the message source
and the second pseudonym represents the intended message
destination.
MSA is the MAC of the packet content, computed by the
source S, to prove to the forwarding node (A) that S is in-
deed a registered network node and that the packet content
was not modiﬁed. The secret key KSA is a key shared be-
tween A and S and it is established through the dynamic key
scheme prior to the protocol execution. When the neighbor
A of the source S receives the packet, it checks the validity
of MSA, and encrypts the source node pseudonym concate-
nated to the received encrypted message hash ES with the
key KA that it shares with the access point. It then replaces
ES with a newly created EA, replaces the distance informa-
tion in MHead with its own distance, and replaces the MAC
received from S by a new MAC computed with the key that
it (A) shares with the next forwarding node (B). Then, A
forwards the message to B. A similar operation over the
message is performed at each node that forwards the mes-
sage. Per-hop re-encryption of the message m is important
so that the access point can verify the hop count and the
identities of the nodes on the routes.
Encryption of the message and of the destination by the
source guarantees that no one but BSS can infer the iden-
tity of the destination D. The re-encryption of message m
by all the nodes on the route guarantees that the message
cannot be tracked by an attacker. Speciﬁcally, at each node,
the message is re-encrypted and therefore altered, so that an
attacker will not be able to track the messages in the net-
work. This is especially important if the attacker controls
several nodes. The node’s location privacy is protected by
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its pseudonym and by the fact that its distance to the ac-
cess point does not propagate any further than its one-hop
neighborhood, so that most of the nodes will not be able to
link not even the node pseudonyms with their distances to
the access point.
However, in the proposed protocol, some information within
the messages is still sent in the clear. Speciﬁcally,
node pseudonyms are sent in the clear to enable nodes to ef-
ﬁciently verify if the messages are intended for them. Node
pseudonyms could also be hidden from passive attackers by
encrypting them with the keys shared between nodes. How-
ever, this would require each node to try to decrypt the des-
tination addresses of all messages that it collects on its inter-
face. Furthermore, even if node pseudonyms are encrypted,
the same problem would appear with interface identiﬁers
and interface pseudonyms. As with node pseudonyms, in-
terface pseudonyms can be hidden, but also at the expense
of eﬃciency.
5.3 Downlink
In this section, we describe the downlink protocol for the
communication between the access point BSD and the mo-
bile node D. We assume that the message m, sent by node
S reached BSD, and needs now to be routed to node D.
We also assume that the access point has information about
the topology of its control area, which it obtained by means
of the book-keeping protocol. Thus, the access point knows
the optimal route to the node D and sends the message to
D via that route. An example of the downlink protocol exe-
cution is shown on Figure 2. In this example the path from
the access point to node D contains two nodes C and D.
Here, Down ﬁeld denotes that the message is sent on a down-
link, tBS , tC and tE are the timestamps that guarantee that
the messages are fresh, BSD is the identiﬁer of the access
point that sent the message, EKD (S,m) is the identiﬁer of
the source S and the message m encrypted by the key shared
between the access point and the destination, PD(t), PC(t)
and PE(t) are the pseudonym of the nodes D,C and E at
time t, and m is the message sent by S for D. KCE and
KED are the symmetric keys that C and E, E and D pair-
wise share. The integrity, authenticity and conﬁdentiality
of the message and of the source identiﬁer are protected by
the encryption of the message by a secret key KD that the
access point shares with the destination D. After creating
the downlink packet, the access point sends it to the ﬁrst
node on the route to D (in this case node C, addressed by
its pseudonym PC(t)). Node C then veriﬁes if the message
truly originated from the access point by decrypting EKC
and verifying the packet content MAC MBS . If the mes-
sage is valid, C forwards the message to the next node on
the list (node PE(t)), but decrypts EKC . Node E then per-
forms the same decryption, veriﬁcation and reduction, and
forwards the message to the next node on the list. This is
repeated until the message reaches its destination. At the
destination, node D veriﬁes the packet authenticity and in-
tegrity by checking MED, and decrypts the message and the
identity of the message source.
Here, like in the uplink protocol, the per-hop changing
packet content prevents attackers from tracking the message
through the network and the node pseudonyms are not for-
DOWNLINK PROTOCOL
BSD : MHead = [BSR, PC(t), tBS , Down,BSD]
: EBS = EKC (PE(t), EKE (PD(t), EKD (S,m)))
: MBS = MACKC (EBS ,MHead)
BSD → C : [BSR, PC(t), tBS , Down,BSD] | EBS | MBS
C : check the validity of MBS , decrypt EKC
: MHead = [PC(t), PE(t), tC , Down,BSD]
: EC = EKE (PD(t), EKD (S,m))
: MCE = MACKCE (EC ,MHead)
C → E : [PC(t), PE(t), tC , Down,BSD] | EC | MCE
E : check the validity of MCE , decrypt EKE
: MHead = [PE(t), PD(t), tE , Down,BSD]
: EE = EKD (S,m)
: MED = MACKED (EE ,MHead)
E → D : [PE(t), PD(t), tE , Down,BSD] | EE | MED
D : check the validity of MACKDR , decrypt EE
Figure 2: An example of the run of the downlink
protocol. The fields changing from the previous hop
are underlined.
warded further then the nodes’ neighborhoods.
If the route is broken and the message delivery fails, the
node that is not able to forward the message, reports the
broken link to the access point, that updates the route and
re-sends the message.
5.4 Inter-station protocol
As we already described, if all access points are controlled
by the same authority, the inter-station protocol is relatively
straightforward. Each uplink packet that arrives to the
source access point BSS is simply forwarded to the destina-
tion access point BSD, where the message is decrypted and
MACs are veriﬁed. Subsequently, a corresponding downlink
message is created, encrypted with the keys that the access
point shares with nodes on the path, and sent to the des-
tination. The inter-station protocol is somewhat diﬀerent
if the node (source/destination) does not trust the access
point controlling its control area.
We consider the following scenario: a node S is situated
in the control area controlled by an untrusted access point
BSU , which is controlled by an untrusted network operator
NU . However, S does not trust BSU either with its iden-
tity or with its keys, but wants, nevertheless, to establish
communication through it. Note here that we assume that
BSU is at all times connected to the home network HNS
of S through a high speed link. Here, there are two issues
related to trust. Node S does not trust NU either with
its identiﬁer or with the identiﬁer of the destination node,
but only shows to NU its pseudonyms. However, in order
to route packets to S, BSU needs to know its distance in
hops to S, and the location of S in the topology of its con-
trol area. This already reveals some information about S
to BSU , but hiding this information from BSU would be
diﬃcult to achieve eﬃcient routing to S.
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To allow a node to communicate through an untrusted net-
work, we propose the following. The node pseudonyms are
still computed only by the node itself and by its home net-
work. If another node A needs to communicate to node S,
A’s messages will be ﬁrst sent to HNS . HNS then com-
putes S’s pseudonym and sends the packet to the untrusted
access point, with this pseudonym as the destination ad-
dress. BSU then sends this packet to S, along the path that
it determines from its control area topology, with the S’s
pseudonym as a destination address.
If the guest node S wants to send a message through the un-
trusted network, it needs to prove to the BSU and to other
nodes in the control area that it is a legitimate node. For
this, S still uses the same dynamic public keys as previously
described, and its public keys are still certiﬁed by its home
network HNS . However, HNS ’s public key is now certi-
ﬁed by the untrusted network NU . By checking both these
certiﬁcates, the nodes that belong to the untrusted network
NU can verify if S is a node that legitimately participates in
network operations. This allows to S to communicate with
the nodes in the untrusted control area, while still protect-
ing its anonymity. Furthermore, BSU can charge HNS (and
implicitly S) for the service, as it can register the packets
passing through its access points. An alternative solution
is if NU issues short term certiﬁcates directly to S, so that
the nodes that belong to the untrusted network do not have
to check two certiﬁcates upon authentication. For this, we
could use an eﬃcient certiﬁcate revocation system proposed
by Micali [27] which alleviates the need for certiﬁcate revo-
cation lists.
5.5 Book-keeping
As we brieﬂy described earlier, the access points keep records
of the time, distances, identities, and pseudonyms of the
nodes in their control area.
Secure and Private Topology Discovery.
Topology discovery is initiated by the access point to dis-
cover network topology that it uses for determining optimal
routing paths. Researchers have already proposed several
topology discovery algorithms in wireless networks [9]. To
the best of our knowledge, all topology discovery proposals
have considered a non-adversarial setting. Here, we propose
a simple topology discovery mechanism that is both secure
and privacy-preserving.
The scheme works as follows. First, the access point sends
a topology discovery request, authenticated with its public
key, with the following message format:
BS → ∗ : TREQ, rid,BS, t | SIGPrKBS (TREQ,BS, t)
where TREQ is a ﬁeld that denotes that the message is
the topology discovery request, BS is the identiﬁer of the
access point that initiates the request (so that only the nodes
controlled by that access point reply), and t is a timestamp
that guarantees the freshness of the message.
Each node receiving this request forwards it to its neigh-
bors if it has not seen the same request before; otherwise, it
drops the packet. If it accepts the topology request, the node
performs neighborhood discovery/update, authenticates its
neighbors (with the keys that it shares with them), encrypts
the neighbor list with the key that it shares with the access
point and sends this encrypted message back to the node
from which it received the request. This neighbor list in-
cludes both the neighbor pseudonyms and their public keys
that they used to establish shared secret keys. The desti-
nation node merges the received information with its own
neighborhood information, and forwards it further. Each
node will repeat the procedure, until the certiﬁcates reach
the access point. The access point will verify the signatures
of the nodes, match the public keys to users’ real identities,
and reconstruct network topology. It is important to note
that each node encrypts its neighborhood information, and
that only the access point can decrypt the content of the
message, whereas other nodes cannot modify or observe this
topology information, and thus cannot reconstruct network
topology by simply observing nodes’ replies to topology dis-
covery.
The frequency of the topology discovery is determined by
the access point, and can be either ﬁxed or can depend on
the speed of the topology change, which can be measured
by the access point based on the estimated optimality of the
routes.
Here, we note that nodes can be tricked by an attacker into
believing that they are each others’ neighbors, which in re-
turn can introduce errors into topology discovery. This at-
tack is similar to the Maﬁa fraud attack [10] and can be
resolved by distance bounding techniques [6]. We do not
see this attack as a major threat to the topology discovery
and maintenance mechanisms, given that the access point
collects information from all network nodes and can detect
inconsistencies in the topology information, even if the nodes
do not use distance bounding.
Topology update.
Maintenance. The nodes maintain their distance to the
access point by collecting distance information from their
neighbors. This information is timestamped and encrypted
by the nodes, which guarantees that malicious outside nodes
cannot insert false distance information and that the inser-
tion of false distance information by compromised nodes can
be detected by the access point. The timestamp in each dis-
tance update guarantees that the nodes accept only recent
distance information. Nodes do not propagate their neigh-
bors’ pseudonyms to other nodes they just send to their
neighbors their own believed distance to the access point at
a given time. This prevents compromised nodes from gather-
ing information about network topology; topology gathering
by an attacker can be dangerous, even if the topology infor-
mation contains node pseudonyms and not node identiﬁers.
Uplink. When a node forwards a packet in the uplink, it
re-encrypts it with the keys that it shares with the access
point. Thus, as the packet moves towards the access point,
it stores the identiﬁers of the nodes on the path. When the
access point receives the packet, it determines what nodes
were on the route, and updates their topology information
accordingly.
Downlink. When the access point transmits a packet in
the downlink, it can piggyback the believed distances to the
nodes on the route onto the packets it sends. Thus, each
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node on the route can decrypt its distance to the access
point, and if the distance information is more recent than
the information that it holds, it will update its distance.
Secure time synchronization
In our protocols we assume only loose time synchronization.
We assume that the reference time is given by the access
points (which are mutually synchronized). Whenever a node
gets in the power range of a access point, it performs clock
synchronization by measuring the time of ﬂight to the ac-
cess point and by taking into account the diﬀerence between
its local time and the global network time provided by the
access point. This protocol is executed in the following man-
ner: the node ﬁrst sends the challenge to the access point,
encrypted with the key shared between the access point and
the node. The access point immediately replies with the
same challenge concatenated with its current time and en-
crypted with the same key. In this message the access point
can also include its processing time. The node measures the
time that was necessary for the challenge to reach the ac-
cess point and to return. The node then deduces the access
point processing time and half of this roundtrip time from
the reference time that it received from the access point and
sets its clock to that value.
Time synchronization can also be performed by leveraging
on neighboring nodes. For example, each node could ask
the nodes in its neighborhood for the time reference, and
perform the same time synchronization as with the access
point. A node disseminating false time information could be
easily detected if the majority of neighboring nodes provide
true time information. The node would eventually synchro-
nize with the access point and could also detect which nodes
were disseminating false time reference. Upon the detection
of false time information, each node can make a complaint to
the access point and after some number of complaints, ma-
licious nodes can be excluded from the network. To avoid
malicious complaints against honest nodes, reputation sys-
tems can be used. The privacy of this scheme is guaranteed
by the dynamic public key scheme described in the previous
subsection.
If the nodes are equipped with GPS receivers (which provide
accurate time reference) secure time synchronization mech-
anism can be avoided altogether. In this paper, we do not
make such assumptions.
Recently, more sophisticated and very precise (µ second pre-
cision) time synchronization techniques have been proposed
for wireless networks [11]. However, in our scheme, we do
not need such a level of precision as we assume only loose
time synchronization. This is because even to guarantee a
high level of node privacy, node pseudonyms and public-keys
do not need to change very frequently. Thus, the diﬀerence
between node clocks can then be as high as several seconds.
Our simple and secure time synchronization technique of-
fers therefore a suﬃcient accuracy for our protocols as it
can achieve microsecond precision with “oﬀ the shelf” com-
ponents.
6. SECURITY AND PERFORMANCE
Having presented our privacy-preserving scheme, we now
analyze its performance and resistance to various attacks.
6.1 Attacker model
We call a node malicious if it is controlled by a malicious ad-
versary and cannot authenticate itself to the access points.
We call a node compromised if it can authenticate itself to
the access points (it is a registered network node), but is
controlled by a malicious adversary. We assume that when
a node is compromised, its secret keys and the other secrets
that it shares with other nodes and the access points be-
come known to the attacker. Thus, a compromised node
is, for the access point and for other nodes, undistinguish-
able from an honest node. We further assume that when
a node is compromised, this is not detected by other net-
work nodes, nor by the central authority (at least for some
time). A central authority (in this case network operator)
can detect a malicious behavior, but it cannot detect if the
node has been captured or compromised. We distinguish
attackers according to the number of malicious and
compromised nodes that they control. By Attacker-C-M
we denote the attacker that controls C compromised and M
malicious nodes [16].
Clearly, with the proposed privacy-preserving scheme and
PPR protocol, we limit the information that attackers can
obtain by observing network traﬃc and the actions that they
can perform to track the nodes and infer users’ real identi-
ties.
All links in the considered network are wireless; hence an
Attacker-0-1 (a single malicious node) can:
• observe if nodes (pseudonyms) in its neighborhood
send/receive messages
• observe which nodes (pseudonyms) in its neighborhood
are neighbors to each other
• observe signal-to-noise (S/N) ratios of the devices in
its neighborhood and try to link each S/N ratio with
a given node pseudonym
• detect signal watermarks of the devices in its neigh-
borhood and link them with node pseudonyms
• estimate how distant nodes in its neighborhood are
from the access point (in term of number of hops),
based on its physical distance to the access point.
A stronger attacker, one that controls a single compromised
node (Attacker-1-0), can observe, in addition to the previ-
ously listed observations, accurate pseudonym distances to
the access point of the nodes (pseudonyms) in its neighbor-
hood and modify network traﬃc or generate traﬃc to infer
nodes’ locations or real identities. Thus, an Attacker-0-1
can only passively observe the traﬃc, whereas Attacker-1-
0 can actively, by generating new traﬃc, try to infer more
information about other nodes.
If an attacker controls several malicious or compromised
nodes, it can observe the traﬃc generated from more
pseudonyms and on a wider network area, and can, by com-
bining the collected information, try to infer users’ real iden-
tities and locations. The attacker can even observe the times
at which packets are sent and by this detect which packets
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Figure 3: An example of a scenario in which an at-
tacker node Att 1 observes a packet p being sent from
PA to PB. The shaded area represents the attacker’s
estimation of the region from which the packet p
could have originated.
carry the same message. Another simple attack is if an at-
tacker sends a message to some destination D and tries to
track the message to establish where D is located. This at-
tack is, however, very ineﬀective as the messages go through
a set of nodes typically not controlled by the attacker and
through access points which act as message mixes thus by
minimize the chance of D’s location being detected.
6.2 Anonymity
Here, we analyze the level of source and destination
anonymity achieved by our scheme. For this, we will use
an anonymity metric based on entropy proposed in [33] and
[21]. Let X be a discrete random variable with probability
function pi = Pr(X = i), where i represents each possible
value that X may take. In our case, each i corresponds to
an element of the anonymity set (a node). We denote by
H(X) the entropy of the system after the attack has taken
place. For each node belonging to the node set of size N , an
attacker assigns a probability pi. H(X) can be calculated
as:
H(X) = −
N∑
i=1
pi log2 pi
Thus the maximum entropy of the system equals to:
Hmax = log2 N
where N is the size of the anonymity set. Based on this, we
compute the degree of anonymity d provided by the system
as:
d =
H(X)
Hmax
The degree of anonymity quantiﬁes the amount of informa-
tion the system is leaking. A system in which a user or a
small group of users appear to be message originators or
destinations, does not provide a high degree of anonymity.
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Figure 4: Pseudonym anonymity degree with
Attacker-0-M and Attacker-C-0, for a control area
with 80 nodes and for two sizes of the set of possible
sources (s = 10 and s = 80).
Previously, we deﬁned source/destination anonymity as the
property that a particular message is not linkable to any
source/destination, and vice-versa.
To analyze our privacy-preserving scheme, we observe two
important aspects: (i) anonymity of node pseudonyms (i.e.,
linkability of the messages to node pseudonyms and their
respective public keys) (ii) mutual linkability of node
pseudonyms. These two aspects combined will give us a true
degree of identiﬁer anonymity.
We ﬁrst observe the degree of pseudonym anonymity that
our system provides. An Attacker-0-1 can observe the be-
havior of its neighboring nodes and try to link the messages
that they transmit to their pseudonyms. Thus, if Attacker-
0-1 observes that a node PA(t) sent a message to PB(t),
it can conclude the following: (i) PA(t) is either the mes-
sage source, or a forwarding node (ii) PB(t) is not the mes-
sage source (iii) other nodes in the attacker neighborhood
P1(t), ..., Pk−1(t) which have not sent any messages in the
recent past are probably not sources of the message. For
simplicity, we denote p(X = PA(t)) by pA.
The attacker assigns to each pseudonym that it observes a
probability that this pseudonym is the source of the message:
pA =
1
s
pB = 0
p1 = ... = pk−1 = 0
pi =
1− pA
N − k − 1
where s ≤ N is the number of sources (including PA(t)) that
might have sent the message given that it is forwarded by
PA(t); k is the number of neighbors of the attacker (includ-
ing PB(t)). The attacker can estimate this number based on
the expected node (or even traﬃc) density in a given region.
If PA(t) is located close to the access point, then almost
any node in the control area is a potential source. If PA(t)
is located on the edge of the control area, then only a few
nodes can be potential message sources. However, Attacker-
10
0-1 does not know which pseudonyms are potential sources,
it can only estimate their number. Thus, the entropy of this
system can be computed as
H(X) =
1
s
log2(s) + (1−
1
s
) log2
s(N − k − 1)
s− 1
If an attacker controls several malicious nodes (Attacker-0-
M), each of the nodes it controls will provide information if
the nodes in its neighborhood could be potential sources of
the message. The entropy in this case is then
H(X) =
1
s′
log2(s
′) + (1− 1
s′
) log2
s′(N −M ′ − 1)
s′ − 1
where M ′ is the number of neighbors of malicious nodes
(typically M ′ = M × k), and s′ ≤ s is the number of nodes
in the set of possible sources that are not neighbors of the
nodes controlled by the attacker.
In the case of Attacker-C-0, where the attacker controls a
set of compromised nodes, the attacker can also exclude
the nodes that it controls from the set of potential sources.
Thus, for all C nodes under the attacker’s control, p(X =
PAtt(t)) = 0, and the entropy can be computed as
H(X) =
1
s′
log2(s
′) + (1− 1
s′
) log2
s′(N − C′ − C − 1)
s′ − 1
where C′ is the number of neighbors of compromised nodes
(typically C′ = C×k). The maximum entropy for Attacker-
0-M and Attacker-C-0 diﬀers, as the size of the anonymity
set for the ﬁrst attacker is N (as the attacker does not control
any registered network nodes), whereas it is N − C for the
second attacker (given that the attacker controls C network
nodes). Thus, for Attacker-0-M, Hmax(X) = log2(N) and
for Attacker-C-0 Hmax(X) = log2(N − C). The size of the
anonymity set in the case of Attacker-0-M remains N even
if the attacker knows that the set of possible sources s is
smaller then N . This is because even if the attacker knows
the size of the set of possible sources, it does not know their
pseudonyms, and thus any of the pseudonyms can be within
the set of possible sources. The same is valid in the case
of Attacker-C-0, except that here, the size of the anonymity
set is diminished for the number of nodes that the Attacker
controls, and for which it knows the pseudonyms and knows
that they are not the message sources.
On Figure 4 we show the pseudonym anonymity degree with
Attacker-0-M and Attacker-C-0, for a control area with 80
nodes and for two sizes of the set of possible sources (s = 10
and s = 80), in the case where the attacker distributes
the nodes uniformly over the network, and where each at-
tacker node has the same number of neighbors (k = 6).
As expected, as the set of possible sources gets smaller,
and the number of attacker nodes increases, the pseudonym
anonymity degree decreases. It is interesting to observe that
the anonymity of the system does not decrease signiﬁcantly
with the reduction in size s of the set of possible sources.
This is because even if the attacker knows the size of this
set, it does not know which pseudonyms belong to the set,
and thus any pseudonym has an equal chance of being in the
set. Only if the attacker controls a larger number of nodes,
pseudonym anonymity decreases signiﬁcantly.
These results demonstrate the eﬀectiveness of our scheme, as
they show that our scheme prevents an attacker that controls
a smaller number of nodes to jeopardize node anonymity. To
link node pseudonyms to messages, an attacker thus needs to
control a large number of nodes, and furthermore needs to be
able to distinguish which packets carry the same messages.
If we would assume that an attacker has information about
network topology, the pseudonym anonymity would be sig-
niﬁcantly smaller. This is because the size of the anonymity
set would be reduced from N to s (for Attacker-0-M) and
to s − C′′ (for Attacker-C-0). Here, C′′ is the number of
attacker nodes that are located within the region of possible
sources.
Pseudonym anonymity is not suﬃcient to quantify the de-
gree of node/user anonymity in the system. Even if an at-
tacker can link messages to node pseudonyms, as the
pseudonyms are changing, it is diﬃcult for the attacker to
distinguish which messages were generated by the same en-
tity, or better, which pseudonyms belong to the same node.
Attackers can try to mutually link node pseudonyms in two
obvious ways: by observing the S/N ratio of the devices and
by observing their signal watermarks.
The ﬁrst attack is simple to mount, but eﬀective only in
some situations. It consists in the following: an attacker
observes S/N ratio of the signals of the nodes in its neigh-
borhood. If the attacker detects the same the S/N ratio for
two pseudonyms which are used one after another, the at-
tacker can conclude that the two pseudonyms are used by
the same node. However, this attack can be performed by
the attacker only during a short period of time, as long as
the node does not move. If the observed node moves, the
attacker cannot correlate anymore the pseudonyms that it
used while it was still with any other pseudonyms that it
generates in the future.
The second attack is more powerful, but requires higher at-
tacker sophistication. This attack is performed such that
the attacker detects signal watermarks of a network node,
and links them with node pseudonyms. Whenever a node
changes its pseudonym, and the signal has the same ﬁnger-
print, the attacker can assume that the previously observed
and the current pseudonyms are used by the same device.
6.3 Location Privacy
Both S/N and ﬁngerprinting attacks aim at linking node
pseudonyms, but also at tracking node locations. This is
because the attacker nodes know their own current loca-
tions and know which pseudonyms appear in their neigh-
borhood. What they need to complete the picture about
node movements is to link node pseudonyms. The ﬁnger-
printing attack aims at doing exactly that. However, the
ﬁngerprinting attack has its limitations as well. One of the
most obvious is that in order to track nodes eﬀectively, the
attacker needs to have many nodes installed all over the con-
trol area. However, this attack can be eﬀectively countered
by implementing radio transmitters that can randomize ﬁn-
gerprints. Nevertheless, if appropriate protection against
this attack is not applied, this attack can be very eﬀective.
If we exclude the possibility of ﬁngerprinting attacks, node
tracking becomes very diﬃcult for the attacker, but not im-
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Figure 5: An example of a scenario in which the
attacker divides the access point control area into
four mix zones of equal size.
possible. By installing a large number of nodes accross the
access point control area, the attacker can track pseudonyms
and correlate them by their locations. To illustrate this, it
is suﬃcient to assume that the attacker has all the informa-
tion about the past locations of node pseudonyms. Then,
given that the users do not move in an unpredictable man-
ner, an attacker can manage to correlate node pseudonyms
and thus jeopardize users’ location privacy. Thus, even
if nodes change their pseudonyms very frequently, it does
not increase the level of their privacy because they cannot
change their locations at the same pace as they change their
pseudonyms. As the nodes are being tracked, their loca-
tions will be suﬃcient for the attacker to conclude which
pseudonyms are used by the same node. This means that an
attacker that can monitor pseudonym locations at all times,
has a high chance of tracking all network nodes. Note that
to perform eﬃcient pseudonym tracking, the attacker needs
to precisely locate network nodes. For this, the attacker
can use triangulization-based methods (for which at least
three attacker nodes are needed to locate the pseudonym),
or location ﬁngerprinting (for which the attacker needs to
perform detailed measurements of the access point control
area). Besides the imprecisions introduced by the location
algorithms, the attacker also needs to cope with an incom-
plete information about pseudonym locations. Therefore, it
would be too pessimistic to assume that the attacker has a
complete information on pseudonym locations. Instead, we
will assume a more realistic scenario in which the attacker
has only partial knowledge on pseudonym locations; namely
we assume that the attacker can observes pseudonym lo-
cations only within some speciﬁc regions controlled by the
attacker.
This problem was already observed in [3] by Beresford and
Stajano. In their work, these authors deﬁne a term mix
zone. A mix zone for a group of users is a connected spa-
tial region of maximum size in which none of the users
has registered any application callback. This means that
a node, while in a mix zone, does not register its location
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
0 20 40 60 80 100 120
number of attacker nodes (Attacker-0-M)
m
a
xi
m
u
m
e
n
tro
py
Hm
ax
MixSize=40
(2 mix zones)
MixSize=20
(4 mix zones)
MixSize=10
(8 mix zones)
MixSize=5
(16 mix zones)
MixSize=3
(26 mix zones) MixSize=2
(40 mix zones)
Figure 6: Maximum entropy as a function of the
number of attacker nodes. The attacker divides the
access point control area into sub-areas (smaller mix
zones). The size of the mix zones determine the level
of the system entropy.
with any authority. Thus, while in its mix zone, a node
can change its identiﬁer, so that it appears as a diﬀerent
entity when it leaves the zone. This scheme works only if
there is a suﬃcient number of other users in the same mix
zone (anonymity set) which guarantees a low probability of
node’s pseudonyms (the pseudonym that it uses before it
enters a zone and the one that it uses when it leaves the
zone) being correlated. In our scenario, mix zones can be
deﬁned in the following way: a mix zone for a set of nodes
is a connected spatial region of a maximum size in which
none of the nodes is in the power range of any of the nodes
controlled by the attacker. This is illustrated in Figure 5. In
this example, the attacker divided the access point control
area into four mix zones thus by reducing the entropy of the
system. Namely, if the attacker subdivides the control area,
it will reduce the number of pseudonyms that can be cor-
related, as it knows which pseudonyms entered which zone,
and which pseudonyms have left the zone. Thus, for each
pair of pseudonyms PX(t1) and PY (t2), the probability that
X = Y (that both pseudonyms originated from the same
node) can be computed as:
Pr(PX(t1), PY (t2) : X = Y ) = 1/MixSize
where PX(t1) is the pseudonym observed by the attacker en-
tering a mix zone at time t1, and PY (t2) is the pseudonym
observed by the attacker leaving the zone at time t2 > t1,
and MixSize is the number of nodes in the mix zone. The
maximum entropy of each of the mix zones is determined
by the number of nodes in that zone. Thus, if the attacker
divides the access point control area into smaller mix zones
(Figure 5), the entropy drops and it is easier for the attacker
to correlate pseudonyms. On Figure 6 we show the maxi-
mum entropy as a function of the number of attacker nodes.
Here, the more nodes that the attacker controls, the sizes of
the mix zones become smaller and their number increases;
hence, the entropy of the system decreases.
Here we note that in the observed scenario, the attacker does
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not hold any additional information about nodes’ possible
behavior (e.g., probable node trajectories). As shown by
Beresford and Stajano, given that the user motion can be
predictable within some geographical location, an attacker
can leverage on that data in order to better correlate nodes’
pseudonyms. The attacker thus can create a matrix M [i, j]
of frequencies with which nodes go from one zone i to an-
other zone j through a mix zone z, where zones i and j are
controlled by an attacker. This data can then be further
used by the attacker to compute the probabilities that the
pseudonyms belong to the same node, and thus by to reduce
the entropy.
The success of pseudonym correlation clearly depends on the
number of nodes that the attacker controls and not so much
on the frequency of pseudonym change. We estimate thus,
that to enable location private communication, it is suﬃcient
that the frequency of pseudonym change needs to be only
two times higher then the average frequency at which the
nodes displace from the zone controlled by an attacker to
the mix zone. We can roughly estimate that this frequency
is around 1
t(r)
, where t(r) is the average time that it takes a
user to cross the distance equivalent to the power range.
6.4 Security of routing
As already elaborated in our routing protocol description,
we use a number of cryptographic primitives to ensure the
secure and correct operation of our PPR protocol. Here we
analyze how resistant is the protocol to various attacks.
False distance information dissemination attack can be
mounted by an attacker that tries to insert false distance
information into the network, by claiming that it is closer
or further from the access point than it really is. Due to
the mutual network membership veriﬁcation between nodes,
this attack cannot be performed by an Attacker-0-M . If
the attack is mounted by an Attacker-1-M , the misbehav-
ing node will be easily detected, as its distance information
will not match the distance information that the attacked
nodes receive from their other neighbors. This attack can
be successful only if the fraction of compromised nodes in
the network is suﬃciently large to fake the whole network
topology without being detected by the access point.
A similar attack is the black hole attack. In this attack an
attacker advertises a close distance to the access point, gath-
ers the traﬃc from other nodes and drops the packets. This
attack is similar to the false distance dissemination attack,
and can be detected in a similar way, and can also be pre-
vented if the nodes randomize their choice of the next hop
node in the uplink. Unlike in mobile ad hoc networks, in hy-
brid ad hoc networks the black hole attack cannot paralyze
the whole network, as the attacker can aﬀect only a fraction
of its neighboring nodes, until it is detected.
Another attack related to network topology is the wormhole
attack, in which an attacker tunnels the received packets
and retransmits them in the remote part of the network.
This attack can threaten the safety of routing and can dis-
turb nodes’ distances to the access point. Similarly to the
black hole attack, the wormhole attack can be resolved by
access point topology control, or by temporal packet leashes
proposed against wormholes in ad hoc networks [15].
Besides topology-related attacks, attackers can try a num-
ber of other attacks. An attacker can try to insert random
packets into the network to drain out nodes’ battery power.
This attack could be mounted, provided that the attacker
controls at least one compromised node (Attack-1-M). How-
ever, because the traﬃc in hybrid ad hoc networks is con-
trolled by the access point, the access point can limit the
use of network resources by each node, thus limiting its ca-
pability to drain the power of network nodes. Furthermore,
unlike in ad hoc networks, in hybrid ad hoc networks, nodes
do not need and are thus not allowed to issue any broadcast
traﬃc, which prevents an attacker from creating broadcast
storms to halt the network.
Other attacks can be envisioned against hybrid ad hoc net-
works; they are not addressed by this work. However, from
a simple analysis it is clear that secure routing in hybrid ad
hoc networks is much more resistant to attacks then routing
in pure ad hoc networks. The main reason for this is the
existence of an on-line authority (i.e., access points) capable
of controlling traﬃc and monitoring node behavior.
6.5 Performance analysis
In this section, we brieﬂy analyze the costs associated with
our scheme. We ﬁrst overview the cryptographic and then
the communication costs.
In terms of cryptographic operations, to secure routing, the
nodes use symmetric-key cryptography, whereas public key
cryptography is only used for the dynamic key establish-
ment. To maintain a dynamic change of keys, nodes period-
ically run authenticated key establishment with their neigh-
bors. Therefore, the establishment of the secret key between
two nodes typically requires the execution of one public key
signature and one signature veriﬁcation per node. An ad-
ditional signature veriﬁcation is required from each node to
verify the certiﬁcate issued by the authority. As key up-
dates between the nodes is performed rarely (every minute,
or even every several minutes) the cryptographic cost of the
dynamic key scheme is not high. This cost is ﬁxed and does
not change with changes in network traﬃc.
For each packet that it forwards, a node performs three
symmetric-key operations: it computes a message MAC with
a key that it shares with the preceding node, it re-encrypts
the message and it computes a new message MAC with a
key that it shares with the next node on the route.
If it would be necessary to perform key updates
with symmetric-key cryptography only, public-keys could be
replaced with TESLA [29] keys. However, this approach
would require a slight modiﬁcation of our protocols and we
leave it for future work.
The communication cost of our scheme is, similarly to the
cryptographic cost, comprised of two parts: the cost of the
dynamic key update scheme and the cost of adding security
and privacy to routing. The cost of the dynamic key update
scheme is the cost of the update of the public keys that the
nodes use to establish their shared secret keys. This cost de-
pends on the update frequency, and for our application, this
frequency is not high. It is thus suﬃcient that the access
point sends one certiﬁcate to each node at the same fre-
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quency at which the keys and the pseudonyms are updated.
This certiﬁcate update can be performed in various ways,
and one possible optimization is if the access point sends
the certiﬁcates to a node each time that it gets in the di-
rect neighborhood of the access point. The communication
cost of adding security and privacy to message forwarding
is small; only a single MAC is added to each message on its
way to and from the access point.
7. RELATED WORK
In this section, we discuss some existing research eﬀorts re-
lated to hybrid ad hoc networks, secure routing, anonymity
and location privacy.
Hybrid ad hoc networks: Bejerano [2] and Wu et al. [37]
study the beneﬁts of installing relaying stations (also called
access points) to provide the nodes with an access to a back-
bone. In [26], Luo et al. present a uniﬁed cellular and ad-hoc
network architecture that enhances control area throughput
while maintaining fairness. In [25] Liu, Liu and Towsley pre-
sented a study of the capacity of hybrid wireless networks.
Much work on hybrid ad hoc network has been also reported
in the framework of TErrestrial Trunked RAdio (TETRA)
project [39].
Secure Routing: So far, the problem of routing in ad hoc
networks has been mainly studied in a non-adversarial set-
ting, and only recently has the focus of research shifted to
the design of secure routing protocols; researchers have al-
ready devised a number of proposals to secure both reactive
(on-demand) and proactive routing protocols and identiﬁed
a number of attacks [16, 19, 17, 15, 28, 32, 14], which we
detail in Section 6.4.
Anonymity and Location privacy: A seminal work in
the domain of anonymity was notably reported by Chaum
in [8]. In [31], Reiter and Rubin present Crowds, a scheme
that enables anonymity of web transactions. In [4], Berthold,
Federrath and Kopsell propose Web MIXes, a system for
anonymous and unobservable internet access. In [3], Beres-
ford and Stajano address the problem of location privacy
in pervasive computing. They propose a new construction,
called a mix zone, a spatial regions in which a user is not
registered for callback (i.e., does not report its location to
other entities). The users then change their identities within
these zones, so that when they leave the zone, their iden-
tity becomes diﬀerent from the one they had when entering
the zone. In [13], Gruteser and Grunwald propose an ap-
proach to enhance location privacy in wireless LANs based
on disposable interface (MAC) identiﬁers. The Mist routing
project [1] addresses the problem of routing a message to
the user while keeping its location private. Mist operates by
making use of a set of mist routers organized in a hierarchical
structure that provides location privacy. In [35], Smailagic
et al. present two location sensing systems and compare
them to the existing location sensing proposals. They fur-
ther perform a user privacy study and show that users expect
two unique behaviors from the system: an introvert model,
where privacy is preferred, and an extrovert model where
availability is preferred. In [20], Jackson proposes a system
that allows user control of the location information disclo-
sure in systems like Active Badge [36]. An important work
on IP private roaming has been reported in the framework
of the Freedom Network [40, 5]. Several researches have also
addressed the problem of preventing foreign operators from
obtaining subscribers identities in GSM networks [22]. Sev-
eral researchers designed privacy-enhancing location servers,
for scenarios in which location data needs to be revealed to
external users [12, 24]. Recently, Kong and Hong have pro-
posed a protocol for anonymous communication in mobile
ad hoc networks [23].
Anonymous credentials: As we already indicated in
Section 4, other schemes can be used to fulﬁll a similar pur-
pose as our dynamic key scheme. One of the best examples
of such scheme are anonymous credentials proposed by Ca-
menisch and Lysyanskaya [7].
8. CONCLUSION
In this paper we have proposed a scheme to secure and pro-
tect the privacy of communication in hybrid ad hoc net-
works. We have shown that both security and privacy preser-
vation can be easily integrated in the same protocol; we
have explained how we managed to reach a high level of pri-
vacy preservation by using pseudonyms and dynamic keys
renewal. We have provided a detailed description of the Pri-
vacy Preserving Routing protocol, as well as an evaluation
of the overhead and of the robustness of our scheme.
To the best of our knowledge, this is the ﬁrst paper address-
ing these issues.
In terms of future work, we intend to reﬁne the quantiﬁca-
tion of the degree of anonymity and location privacy in var-
ious scenarios and to perform a detailed simulation study of
our solution.
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